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Criteria for Evaluating Authentication Systems 
 
Steven C. Way 









User authentication is an important component of information security.  It is critical in addressing many concerns that 
consumers and business have over the risk of identity theft.  However, there is no systematic method to measure how good an 
authentication mechanism is in a given business context.  This paper outlines nine criteria businesses can use to assess 
authentication systems.  With these criteria, businesses are better equipped to select authentication systems that meet the 
needs of both their organization and their customers, and provide better protection against identity theft and other computer 
crimes. 
Keywords 
Authentication, evaluation criteria,  information security. 
INTRODUCTION 
Information systems security is often defined as the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an information system.  
Authentication is a key aspect of information systems security often associated with confidentiality (Tipton and Henry, 
2007).  Authentication is the verification of the unique identity of a user or system so that the user can gain certain privileges 
for system access and is the first step leading to the security constructs of accountability, auditing, and rights provisioning 
(Tipton and Henry, 2007).   
Authentication may be verified by what an entity knows (knowledge), by what an entity owns (token), or by what an entity 
has in the form of a characteristic (Tipton and Henry, 2007) in order to control access to desired systems.  Knowledge-based 
(KBA) and token-based authentication (TBA) are the two traditional techniques of authentication used (Jain, Hong, and 
Pankanti, 2000), although use of characteristic-based authentication (CBA) such as fingerprints, facial recognition, and other 
biometrics are on the rise.  Table 1 provides a sample of several authentication applications with the typical mechanism 
listed. 
Sample Application Knowledge-based Token-based Characteristic-based 
Credit purchase in store  Card Signature 
Credit purchase online Card number   
ATM cash withdrawal PIN number Card  
Credit purchase at gas station  Card or RFID key  
Automobile membership services  Card  
Customs  Passport Face 
IS system user access Password   
Secure VPN Password Digital token  
Security room Password Key Iris/Retina scan 
PDA/Laptop   Fingerprint 
Table 1. Authentication Examples 
Inappropriate or inadequate authentication may cause serious damage to systems and users.  Criminals are highly motivated 
to circumvent access controls and gain access to systems to perform fraudulent and other illegal activities. Cyber crime and 
identity theft have caught consumers' attention where concerns over fraud are cited as a top reason for avoiding online 
shopping (Harvey, 2008).  According to one survey of identity theft victims, 19% of known thefts were conducted online or 
via data breaches, and a further 23% were conducted during a transaction (Kim, 2008).  Once an identity has been stolen it 
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may further be used to gain access to other systems and services.  Therefore, strong authentication systems become a critical 
issue in combating identity theft and identifying fraud (Wang, Yuan, and Archer, 2006). As the first step for accessing a 
system, authentication is also an early line of defense against identity theft.  The ability to measure and compare 
authentication systems would assist in determining the best methods of authentication for different systems.  Aligning 
appropriate authentication mechanisms with information systems would reduce the risk of unauthorized system access.  It 
will also help to relieve customers' concerns on security risks and boost their confidence.  
Several  papers have discussed authentication performance measurements for  specific biometric authentication methods 
(Golfarelli, Maio, and Malton, 1997; Jain et al., 2000). Burrows et al. (1990) identified  metrics of accuracy, speed, storage, 
cost, and ease of use, affect efficacy as being important for  examining biometrics performance.  In addition, they also 
pointed out that  authentication data collection should be universal, unique, permanent, collectable, and consider 
performance, acceptability, and circumvention techniques. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no general 
theoretical framework to address the evaluation criteria and performance measurement for a variety of authentication 
methods.  
The purpose of this paper is to develop a comprehensive authentication assessment framework and to setup the criteria and 
performance measurement that can be used by both IT support and management personnel to evaluate an authentication 
system for business applications.  The tool will incorporate criteria addressing not only technical, but also behavioral, and 
social issues. The authentication evaluation criteria and performance measurement can be used for developing and selecting 
the most appropriate authentication method for a variety of systems under a variety of situations. It will allow decision 
makers to make appropriate decisions impacting security, and authentication specifically, which may have long term 
influences on overall organizational performance.   
A FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CRITERIA 
  
 
Figure 1.  Decision Framework using Evaluation Criteria 
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We propose a framework as shown in Figure 1 to evaluate authentication technologies in order to determine the ideal solution 
for a given context.  Several potential authentication technologies utilizing various authentication techniques are evaluated 
and compared to one another through the use of criteria established by key stakeholders.  This study assumes the three most 
important stakeholders are organizational management, IT support personnel, and system users.  Stakeholders are able to 
recommend various criteria according to their perspectives, making the framework comprehensive and able to address 
concerns from different stakeholders covering management, technical, and behavioral issues.  Authentication technologies 
can then have their features scored based on the estimated value of the criteria from stakeholders and experts, and the scored 
criteria can further be modified by a weighting of criteria according to stakeholder priorities.  The highest scoring 
authentication technology becomes the ideal solution.   
This framework and methodology is consistent with the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (Saaty, 2008).  In AHP, the 
strength of the decision is based on the criteria selected and the criteria weighting from various stakeholders.  Criteria are 
often weighted based on pair-wise comparison by the stakeholders performing the evaluation. 
The criteria for the evaluation of authentication technologies have been selected based on literature and authors' previous 
professional experience. They are summarized in Table 2. These criteria affect the overall effectiveness and efficiency of an 
authentication mechanism. They are closely related to each other but each can be measured independently. On their own, 
each criterion must meet a minimum threshold set by an organization to determine acceptability, but together, the criteria can 
be used to compare different authentication techniques in a given context.   
 
Criterion Definition Supporting References 
Accuracy - the capability of the 
authentication system to correctly 
determine a user’s identity  
(Bolle, Connell, and Ratha, 2002) 
(Golfarelli et al., 1997) 
Robustness - the capability of the 
authentication system to resist 
compromise 
(Part I: Introduction and general 
model. 2006) 
User Acceptance - the willingness of users to use 
the authentication system 
(Davis, 1989) 
Accessibility - the availability of the 
authentication system to target 
users 
(Gong, 1993) 
Feasibility - the practicality of implementing 
the authentication system 
(Sandhu, 2003) 
Applicability - the capability to apply the 
authentication system to different 
contexts by owners 
(Chung-Huang Yang, 1999) 
Responsiveness - the speed of the authentication 
system to respond to users  
(Menasce, 2003) 
Non-reputability - the capability of the 
authentication system to prevent a 
dispute with users about access to 
a system 
(Gürgens, Rudolph, and Vogt, 
2005) 
Maintainability - the effort required to maintain 
the integrity of the system 
(Rombach, 1987) 
Table 2. Authentication Evaluation Criteria 
The importance of these criteria may be viewed differently by different stakeholders. Figure 2 clusters the criteria by 
hypothesized stakeholder priorities.   
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Figure 2. Stakeholder Perspectives on Authentication Criteria 
The measurement of each evaluation criterion 
Accuracy 
Accuracy is a criterion that has multiple meanings as a metric.  In the world of biometrics, accuracy may be referred to as the 
“degree of match” which is often characterized by false rejection and false acceptance error rates (Bolle et al., 2002).  For 
authentication, however, it is necessary to have a more exact perspective for accuracy because a single user’s identity is either 
accepted by a system, or it is rejected.  A binary statistical classification from the world of multivariate statistics is a more 
appropriate perspective on accuracy.  With this, there are four possible outcomes for user authentication to a system as 
follows: a correct user who is granted access (true positive), an incorrect user who is granted access (false positive), a correct 
user who is denied access (false negative), and an incorrect user who is denied access (true negative).  Table 3 provides a 
summary. 
 
EXPECTED OUTCOME vs. 
Actual Result 
TRUE FALSE 
Positive True Positive False Positive 
Negative False Negative True Negative 
Table 3. Accuracy Results: Expected Outcome vs. Actual Result 
 
The accuracy of a user authentication system can be defined as the correct determination of a user’s identity.  An accuracy 
rate is summarized mathematically as the number of correct determinations of a user’s identity, both valid and invalid users, 










Figure 3.  Accuracy Rate 
Way et al.  Criteria for Evaluating Authentication Systems 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 5 
 
With token and KBA systems, accuracy is generally determined by the correct presence and check of the data required by the 
system.  For biometrics systems, accuracy is measured by an error rate, i.e. the percentage of subjects being identified 
incorrectly (Bolle et al., 2002). There are two types of errors: type I errors where the correct subject is rejected, and type II 
errors where the incorrect subject is accepted (Jain et al., 2000).   
The accuracy of authentication systems is dependent on the technology being used.  With biometrics, problems related to 
pattern recognition errors are difficult to determine (Golfarelli et al., 1997).  Noise in a sensed data signal such as dust on a 
fingerprint reader, or background noise on a voice recognition system may affect accuracy (Jain and Ross, 2004).  Accuracy 
may also be affected by the coincidence of two similar patterns such as fingerprints, or the cross-over rate of type I and type 
II errors related to iris recognition (Golfarelli et al., 1997).  Problems may also arise due to a change in a sensor (Jain and 
Ross, 2004) where two sensors may not read data in an identical fashion.  While the examples above all reduce accuracy, an 
increased number of biometric dimensions being measured can help reduce cross-over errors resulting from false acceptance 
and false rejection errors (Golfarelli et al., 1997).  In addition, using more than one biometric technique in the same system 
should also increase the accuracy of the system(Jain and Ross, 2004). 
In order to properly use the assessment tool, the maximum acceptable error rates must be set by an organization.  Tiers of 
acceptable accuracy levels should then be set to differentiate between various authentication techniques.  Authentication 
techniques with error rates greater than the maximum acceptable rate can be excluded from further evaluation.  Finally, the 
error rates for a given authentication technique should be either determined through theoretical calculations (Golfarelli et al., 
1997) from a simulation, or sample testing if possible.  
Robustness 
Robustness is the ability to prevent or resist compromising attacks such as sharing, stealing, imitation, and counterfeiting.  In 
KBA robustness is traditionally measured as how difficult it is to guess a password or the length of time the authentication 
mechanism can withstand direct brute-force attacks as determined by the encryption strength or the password length (Jain and 
Ross, 2004).  In TBA, robustness can be measured by how difficult it is for a criminal to make a fake ID and the capability of 
the system to detect a fake ID card. The robustness of TBA can be improved by implementing some counterfeit technologies 
such as  watermarks, holographs, hidden patterns, embedded IC chips, enhanced photos (Thompson, 2007), etc. Unlike KBA 
or TBA, biometric data is not easily stolen or shared (Jain and Ross, 2004). The robustness therefore should be measured by 
how difficult it is for a criminal to mimic a person's signature, voice, appearance, etc. (such as replicating the speed and 
movement when writing a signature, or matching more measured dimensions for facial features, etc. ) and the capability of 
the system to detect the imitation.  
Robustness would include the distinctiveness of data such as uniqueness of patterns (Jain and Ross, 2004).  Other techniques 
to enhance robustness include resistance to spook attacks, multi-biometric systems, and challenge-response systems (Jain and 
Ross, 2004) or, the proper allocation of infrastructure resources to handle demand and system requirements, and alternative 
authentication techniques in the form of gradually strengthening authentication (Aura, Nikander, and Leiwo, 2001).  Single, 
double, or triple authentication factors such as TBA only, TBA and KBA, or TBA, KBA, and CBA, will also greatly 
influence a method’s robustness (Tipton and Henry, 2007).  Lastly, any known vulnerabilities to an authentication 
mechanism should be considered.   
With robustness being more technical in nature, measurement of an authentication technique on this criterion may be 
borrowed from the ITSEC standards on construction and operations vulnerabilities (Information technology security 
evaluation criteria (ITSEC), 1991) or the Common Criteria (Part I: Introduction and general model. 2006).  Vulnerabilities 
analysis and knowledgeable security experts within the organization may assign a score to the authentication technique based 
on a robustness level determined from the ITSEC or Common Criteria scales. 
User Acceptance 
User acceptance is the willingness of users to use an authentication technology.  Previous attempts to predict user acceptance 
relied on predicting the adoption rate of technology as indicated by perceived usefulness and ease of use by users (Davis, 
1989).  Where historical data is available, user acceptance can be measured by previous usage rates to predict the adoption 
rate of a new implementation.  However, when new technology is to be deployed, surveys from technology acceptance 
models should be used to measure users’ attitudes towards a technology as an indicator of users’ willingness to use a new 
technology (Davis, 1989).   
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There may be a variety of user reasons for adopting a particular authentication technique.  These benefits can include 
enhancing user convenience by eliminating passwords through the use of biometrics (Jain and Ross, 2004), or improving 
customer satisfaction through automation (Jain et al., 2000).  Some authentication techniques may simply be mandated such 
as banks telling vendors they must start accepting smart credit and debit cards, and only issuing the new cards to consumers 
(Harvey, 2008).  However, user acceptance may also be influenced by other issues such as the ease and comfort of acquiring 
data, and threats to privacy (Jain et al., 2000).  User adoption may also be related to universality of data such that all users 
would need to possess a particular biometric attribute (Jain and Ross, 2004). 
Accessibility 
Accessibility is the availability of the authentication technology to users.  Some may try to achieve accessibility through 
replication and distribution of the technology (Gong, 1993).   Alternatively, accessibility may be the reduction of a 
dependence on a technology (Gong, 1993).  Accessibility may be measured by the exposure of the authentication technology 
to the target audience.  For example, banks and credit card companies in Canada are looking to add computer chips to their 
credit cards and debit cards in order to address fraud issues (Harvey, 2008).  However, the implementation of a new 
technology such as this also requires that the hardware and readers must be available for vendors.    Furthermore, even if 
there is a required widespread user-acceptance and adoption of the technology, vendors must still make the technology 
available for consumers to use in order for the authentication mechanism to be accessible, and therefore more effective 
overall. 
Measurement of the accessibility of an authentication mechanism first depends on whether a closed environment such as in 
an organization or an open environment such as a restaurant is the location of use for the authentication mechanism.  In the 
former case, 100% accessibility rate is presumed if an organization will ensure access to the mechanism.  In an open system, 
however, accessibility should be determined from historical data, or projected data if a new authentication system is to be 
rolled out.  An example of a rollout is the distribution of smart cards in Canada where 620,000 locations currently accept 
credit cards (Harvey, 2008).  Accessibility is directly related to the proportion of locations that will have credit card readers 
able to accept the new smart-card technology. 
Feasibility 
Feasibility is the practicality of implementing an authentication technology.  Feasibility is often associated with cost, but it 
may also be used to describe an organization’s capability of implementing a system determined by the balance of features 
against other goals of the organization (Sandhu, 2003).  Firms need to have the financial resources, the required operating 
environment, and the ability to meet organizational requirements.  If a particular required element is lacking, then the 
difficulty of acquiring that element must be factored into the feasibility of the authentication mechanism.  Generally, cost is 
the single most important factor for authentication security (Jain et al., 2000).  Costs may be influenced by storage and 
processing requirements (Jain et al., 2000). The costs need to be balanced against risks associated with errors to determine an 
acceptable risk level (Jain et al., 2000).  For multi-biometric systems, it is the balancing of cost versus performance which 
must be carefully considered (Jain and Ross, 2004), and for measuring authentication, this balance drives the measure for 
feasibility.  Feasibility may also include other restrictions on a system such as capacity constraints.   
Applicability 
Applicability is the ability to apply an authentication mechanism to multiple scenarios.  This aligns with other perspectives 
on applicability as the ability of a multi-purpose technology to be applied to multiple applications (Chung-Huang Yang, 
1999).  Applicability may be measured by determining the number of different applications a technology will be used for.  
For example, smart credit and debit cards may make sense for transactions done in-person, but smart card technology does 
not address online concerns so is not applicable to the context.  In order to allow the use of smart cards for online 
transactions, consumers may require additional technology (Harvey, 2008).  Similarly, some organizations may examine an 
ID card that can be used for physical security access in addition to systems access, while other organizations may employ ID 
cards for physical access, and use another technology such as passwords for online access. 
Industry appears to be trying to improve the overall applicability of different authentication mechanisms.  Many different 
systems appear to use similar requirements for accessing systems.  This creates a scenario where access to many systems may 
be centralized and controlled by one user directory.  In turn, a single sign-on process where a user only needs to sign-on once 
to a system may then be implemented.  Once credentials have been successfully validated,   users may then interact with 
several different applications.  This process enhances authentication applicability as the shared common user credentials from 
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several one-to-one authentication to application relationships are merged to create a one-to-many authentication to 
applications relationship. 
Responsiveness 
Responsiveness is the performance of the system related to speed (Menasce, 2003). For users, speed is related to how quickly 
the system responds to an input, usually measured in a unit of time such as milliseconds.  The responsiveness of a system 
influences the overall efficiency of an authentication system as it places restrictions on acceptable performance issues such as 
search times (Jain et al., 2000) which relate to data storage issues (Jain et al., 2000) and search algorithms used.  For instance, 
a fingerprint search could be slow but the lookup could be much faster if the request was combined with a user ID as the user 
ID may be used as an index.  Responsiveness also depends on the degree of automation. Automated data reading and 
verification can be much faster than manual data reading and checking. As system administrators configure authentication 
parameters to balance accuracy and costs, the overall responsiveness of the authentication technique considered will be 
influenced. 
Non-Reputability 
Non-repudiation has been defined as the inability for two parties to deny an exchange of data (Gürgens et al., 2005).  For the 
purposes of authentication, non-reputability is the legally recognized ability of the system to prevent disputes for an exchange 
of data.  Non-reputability examines aspects of an authentication mechanism that would track auditing of an authentication 
event in order to determine if it was successful or not and if the event involved the two known parties.  Non-repudiation is 
particularly important when considering the impact on e-commerce or credit card fraud.  Credit card transactions are based on 
the premise that the person providing the credit card number is the person named on the credit card and the account owner for 
the corresponding account at a financial institution.  Non-repudiation means that a vendor and customer cannot dispute that a 
transaction has taken place.  Similarly, non-repudiation means that a vendor and a financial institution cannot dispute that 
funds were transferred.  In order to measure non-repudiation, parties to a transaction must use mutually agreed processes and 
technology to guarantee an exchange of data.  For computer transactions, this often includes an exchange of public and 
private keys based on certificates for machines or accounts participating in a transaction.  Deniability of a transaction may 
result in a loss of resources to an unknown source. 
Maintainability 
Maintainability is the amount of effort required to change a system or keep a system running properly over a period of time.  
As a metric, maintainability has been described as the average amount of effort required per maintenance task to support a 
technology (Rombach, 1987).  Maintainability is a temporal measure and is often tracked in person-hours.  When considering 
the maintainability of authentication mechanisms, one should examine the amount of effort required to correct an error, such 
as a pattern collision in a fingerprint reader, or the amount of effort required to update or upgrade a system, such as moving 
from a 4-digit pin to a 6-digit pin.  In general, maintainability looks at the future viability of an authentication mechanism 
given various foreseen and unforeseen problems.  The ability to rapidly address any problems with an authentication 
technology reduces the number of maintenance hours on a technology which in turn makes the security system more 
efficient. 
THE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 
In this section we use our evaluation criteria to compare KBA, TBA, and CBA mechanisms in order to demonstrate the value 
and applicability of our evaluation framework.  
Accuracy of KBA and TBA is generally higher than CBA.  Assuming a valid user is attempting authentication, KBA and 
TBA compare predefined indexes with authentication data which has a binary choice of either 100% match or mismatch.  
CBA, however, tends to have less accuracy. CBA accuracy is affected by the number of biometrics dimensions utilized.    
Type I or type II errors may occur from pattern collisions or improper readings of the characteristic making overall accuracy 
for CBA slightly lower than KBA or TBA. 
In terms of robustness, KBA is the least robust, then TBA, and CBA is the most robust mechanism.  KBA is susceptible to 
user sharing of authentication information as well as password steeling, brute-force and dictionary attacks, while TBA is 
susceptible to token sharing and forgery.  A physical token restricts the likelihood of simultaneous authentication from two or 
more locations.  In addition, security mechanisms are constantly being improved on tokens to monitor locations where they 
are used and to prevent forgery.  This makes TBA more robust than KBA.  It is extremely difficult to share or replicate 
characteristic-based patterns since most are biologically linked.  CBA may be susceptible to spoofing and brute-force attacks, 
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but these are more difficult to perform because biometric patterns must be simulated in order to create a pattern collision.  An 
increased number of measurement points, or multi-biometric authentication further reduces this opportunity for attack, and 
restricts access to the system that may otherwise be granted in a collision.  As a result, CBA is considered the most robust of 
the techniques.   
Anecdotal observation indicates less robust authentication tends to have a high user acceptance.  For KBA, memorizing a 
password is not invasive and the authentication process is usually routine involving a keyboard or touch-pad.  High user 
acceptance is expected for KBA while TBA is slightly less.  TBA often has an initial administrative requirement to generate 
the token.  For example, passport administrative requirements may include the submission of a birth certificate, driver’s 
license, or other form of accepted identification.  In addition, a physical token must be carried in order to be authenticated.  
Depending on the number of systems a user has access to, the number of tokens a user must maintain may be inconvenient.  
These hindrances to TBA are often balanced by a simple authentication process with no need to memorize a password.  This 
makes TBA moderately accepted by users.  CBA has the lowest user-acceptance and also has an administrative requirement 
of registration prior to use.  Privacy concerns are a major factor that contribute to low user acceptance.  In addition, the 
authentication process itself may be intrusive to users who disapprove of retina scans, fingerprint readers, or other types of 
scans and may offset any convenience gains.   
KBA tends to be widely accessible, with TBA less, and CBA the least accessible.  A combination of high user acceptance 
and lower infrastructure costs means KBA is often easier to establish and more widely available than other mechanisms.  
With TBA, organizations requiring the use of tokens generally ensure the ability to use them is available wherever 
authentication is required, but it may not always be in place.  A requirement for specific hardware is often associated with 
TBA making it less accessible.  Like TBA, organizations that require CBA systems attempt to ensure the ability to use them 
is available wherever authentication is required.  These organizations are required to invest in more expensive technology 
that consistently reads and analyzes characteristic patterns in the same way.  This technology combined with decreased user 
acceptance leads to reduced accessibility.  
Feasibility for KBA is generally high, TBA is moderate, and CBA is lowest.  KBA is well documented, widely used, and 
generally the cheapest type of authentication mechanism to implement.  For data management, only small amounts of storage 
are required and authentication is quickly confirmed by simple lookups based on a user id as a key.  TBA mechanisms are 
also well documented and use readily accessible technology such as computers, and scanners.  They use marginally more 
amounts of storage compared to KBA.  In addition, dependence on a token generally requires more resources to create 
tokens. The extra expense to operate makes TBA less feasible than KBA.  CBA is the least feasible of all the authentication 
methods.  It is usually more expensive to implement than TBA because much of the equipment is more specialized.  For data 
management, the largest amounts of disk space are required to store complex patterns and more processing power is required 
to perform the calculations to compare patterns.   
In terms of applicability, KBA systems tend to be highly applicable to a variety of scenarios.  This is in contrast to TBA 
which is the least applicable authentication mechanism.  TBA systems tend to utilize specialized data to enhance security, 
and specialized algorithms to access the data.  Widespread use of a token for multiple applications reduces security overall as 
the ability to read and process data needs to be shared by several systems.  In addition, the technology required to process the 
token also needs to be available at all locations. Therefore, token-based applicability is generally low.  CBA systems have 
moderate applicability.  Universal availability of a characteristic which cannot be shared enhances security which provides 
more opportunities to deploy CBA in high risk and high security settings.  For systems requiring CBA, any technology 
requirements are generally available, thereby making applicability moderate for CBA. 
For responsiveness, KBA and TBA are highly responsive since systems quickly look up known responses in a database and 
compare with an authentication attempt to determine the validity of the credentials provided.  Responsiveness may be 
affected by the number of records stored in a system, but this is common to most if not all authentication mechanisms and 
can often be improved through various database management techniques.  CBA is the least responsive mechanism.  Data in 
the form of patterns is obtained from users often using scanners, and these patterns are then compared to other stored 
patterns.  The complexity and subtle variation of patterns requires more processing than other authentication forms, which 
reduces system responsiveness for users.   
Non-reputability is often missing from KBA techniques.  The potential for high false positive and false negative errors in 
accuracy from shared or forgotten knowledge creates doubt and deniability for users.  Despite security policies, the sharing of 
passwords or security knowledge continues affording users the ability to dispute an exchange of data.  Furthermore, the 
manner in which passwords are managed by administrators and communicated to users may also make non-repudiation 
difficult as users may argue they are not the only people who have access to passwords.  TBA techniques create a moderate 
mechanism for non-repudiation to occur.  The presence of a token means that deniability becomes an argument over who had 
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possession of a token, as opposed to who used a token.  CBA techniques have the best mechanism for non-repudiation.  The 
extreme difficulty in sharing or reproducing a characteristic makes deniability very difficult.  In addition, the potential for 
false positives and false negative errors in accuracy are reduced as more characteristic measures are introduced, further 
limiting the deniability of an authentication event.   
The maintainability of KBA mechanisms is generally high.  The standard use and operation of KBA has created several 
management tools depending on the technology, with many common management processes known by technology experts.  
TBA mechanisms are generally more difficult, therefore scoring low on maintainability.   The creation of a token and the 
replacement of a token if one is lost or stolen is a multi-step process.  In addition, revocation of tokens is difficult to manage, 
as inactive tokens must often be tracked in addition to valid tokens.  These are the primary reasons why TBA has low 
maintainability.  The maintainability of a CBA mechanism is generally moderate.  After initial registration there are few 
processes required to maintain or track characteristics as they are a part of users.  Revocation of CBA should be easy to 
manage centrally as only a user’s access needs to be adjusted.  The complex nature of CBA technology means collisions from 
similar patterns may be difficult to resolve but since they are infrequent, the overall maintainability of CBA is moderate. 
 
Criterion Knowledge-based Token-based Characteristic-based 
Accuracy HIGH HIGH MED 
Robustness LOW MED HIGH 
User Acceptance HIGH MED LOW 
Accessibility HIGH MED LOW 
Feasibility HIGH MED LOW 
Applicability HIGH LOW MED 
Responsiveness HIGH HIGH LOW 
Non-reputability LOW MED HIGH 
Maintainability HIGH LOW MED 
Table 4. Comparison Summary of Authentication Mechanisms 
Table 4 summarizes the nine authentication criteria and how the three authentication mechanisms compare for each.  No 
single authentication mechanism scores high in all the criteria, therefore, stakeholder weighting becomes the differentiating 
factor for selecting an authentication technology.  Furthermore, while this demonstration focuses on general authentication 
mechanisms, specific techniques should be compared as variance in technologies, even using the same mechanism, will 
create variance in the scoring of the criteria.  One other observation from the table is that if no one mechanism scores high in 
all the criteria, perhaps a combination of different techniques becomes the best solution.  With the combination of 
authentication techniques, one technology may complement another to overcome a weakness, or create a synergy in criteria 
to improve the score for the authentication system.  Table 1 which lists sample applications demonstrates how combinations 
of authentication mechanisms may be utilized for an authentication system. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a multi-criteria evaluation framework to assess the quality of authentication mechanisms and 
we have demonstrated the usability of this evaluation framework. As businesses ponder existing authentication mechanisms, 
and new authentication mechanisms in the future, these criteria should help aid in the evaluation process so that appropriate 
authentication mechanisms are chosen for the right context.  Sensitive contexts would ideally have more robust and accurate 
authentication mechanisms, while commerce contexts may focus more on non-reputability, and leisure contexts may 
emphasize system responsiveness and user acceptance.  With properly selected authentication mechanisms for a system, it is 
expected that identity theft and other cyber crimes would be less of a concern for businesses and consumers.   
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